



























Abstract - We demonstrate that in models where agents have concerns for status the model predictions can 
drastically change depending on whether status is modelled as an ordinal or cardinal magnitude. As a proof, we 
show that two well known theoretical findings are not robust to the substitution of ordinal status with cardinal 
status (Frank (1985)) and viceversa (Clark and Oswald (1998)). 
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 1 Introduction
Since the work of Veblen (1899) the economic literature has been enriched by a large
number of models where agents show concerns for status. Two main approaches to
the modelling of status have been applied. The ￿rst follows the formalization of
Duesenberry (1949) and sees status as the distance between one’s own and others’
possession of some status-bearing good or asset. In this approach status is intrinsi-
cally cardinal (see also Leibenstein (1950), Pollack (1976), Fershtman et al. (1996),
Clark and Oswald (1998), Cooper et al. (2001), Bowles and Park (2005), Clark et al.
(2008)). The second approach follows Frank (1985) and sees status as the rank in the
distribution of the possession of the status-bearing good or asset. In this approach
status is intrinsically ordinal (see for instance Robson (1992), Cole et al. (1992),
Bagwell and Bernheim (1996), Corneo and Jeanne (1998), Hopkins and Kornienko
(2004)).
The contributors to this stream of literature have rarely explained their choice
to follow one approach or the other. A part from rare exceptions { e.g. Hopkins
and Kornienko (2004), Clark et al. (2006) { the distinction between ordinal and
cardinal status is not even acknowledged. Models incorporating concerns for status
are usually presented as being related to both approaches (as an example see Frank
(1985) who refers to Duesenberry (1949) but then de￿nes status as ordinal and
Cooper et al. (2001) who refer to Frank (1985) and then de￿ne status as cardinal).
Most important, how results depend on whether status is ordinal or cardinal is never
an object of discussion.
Such an omission can be explained only in two ways. Either results are substan-
tially una￿ected by the way status is modelled or economists working in this area
of research have so far overlooked the issue. In this paper we show that the choice
to model status as ordinal or cardinal does a￿ect results in a substantial way. In-
tuitively, when status is ordinal the marginal bene￿t from spending in conspicuous
consumption is lower the more dispersed the distribution of social competitors in
the consumption of the relevant good. In the presence of cardinal status, instead,
the reverse relation can hold; in particular, this happens if people evaluate small dif-
ferences in conspicuous consumption less than proportionally with respect to large
di￿erences.
We provide two examples where switching from cardinality to ordinality and from
ordinality to cardinality drastically change the model predictions (the examples are
constructed using well known theoretical results obtained, respectively, by Frank
(1985) and Clark and Oswald (1998)). We conclude that, in models where agents
1have concerns for their relative standing, the choice between cardinal and ordinal
status should be more accurately motivated.
2 Cardinal and Ordinal Status
A simple and intuitive de￿nition of ordinal and cardinal status is o￿ered by the
metaphor of the race scoring system. Let f1;:::;ng be the set of cars participating
in a race. We describe the ￿nal result of the competition by a vector, say v 2 <n,
whose generic element vi denotes car i’s race time. Suppose that we have to de￿ne
a scoring system for the annual car championship, that is, we have to specify a
function, say S(￿), which assigns to each car a number depending on vector v. Such
a scoring system can naturally be de￿ned as ordinal if S(￿) only depends on the
order of arrival induced by v. Instead, the scoring system can be de￿ned as cardinal
if S(￿) depends on v otherwise.
This taxonomy can easily be applied to social status. Economic agents can be
substituted for cars and the amount of the status-bearing good possessed for race
times. So, S(￿) can be reinterpreted as a social status function. This provides us
with a distinction between ordinal and cardinal status which is based on how the
prizes of the \social race" are assigned.
A natural question to ask at this point is which de￿nition of status better repre-
sents people’s concerns for relative standing. However, as far as we are interested in
the conclusions that can be drawn from the introduction of status concerns, there
is another question that logically comes ￿rst: does modelling status as ordinal or
cardinal make any di￿erence for the predictions of the model? Only if the answer
to this question is yes then the issue of whether status should be modelled as an
ordinal or cardinal magnitude becomes relevant. In the next two subsections we
illustrate examples which prove that the answer to the latter question is yes.
2.1 Example 1: Status and Saving Behaviour
In his seminal paper Frank (1985) provides a proposition which states that, as in-
come rises, the share of income spent in non-positional goods grows more rapidly (or
decline less rapidly) in the presence of concerns for status (Proposition 3 pag. 105).
Frank uses this ￿nding to attempt an explanation of the saving behaviour of Amer-
icans which shows a cross-sectional positive correlation with income at any point in
time but not over time { see Proposition 3 0 (pag. 105) and Section IV (pag. 109) in
Frank (1985). In Frank’s model the consumer problem is
2max
x;y U(x;y;R(x))
s:t: Pxx + Pyy = M
(1)
where x is the positional good, y is the non-positional one, Px and Py are the price
of x and y, M is income and R(x) is the status of the consumer. In particular,
R(x) =
R x
x0 f(s)ds where f(￿) is the density function for x values and x0 is the
smallest value of x in the relevant population. This means that status is determined
by the consumer’s rank in the consumption of x and, as anticipated, it is ordinal.
Finally, function U is supposed to satisfy standard concavity assumptions.
Manipulating the FOC obtained from problem (1) and introducing elasticities















where EUi is the elasticity of utility with respect to the i-th argument and ERx is
the elasticity of R(￿) with respect to x.
Since (2) di￿ers from the standard condition just for the additional term EU3ERx=EU2,
Proposition 3 holds only if such a term is decreasing in x. Frank assumes that this
is the case because, he argues, it is very likely that ERx decreases monotonically in
x. In particular he claims that, in a population where x0 > 0, for any f(￿) which
is likely to be observed in practice the elasticity ERx = f(x)=(R(x)x) is in￿nite for
x = x0 and then decreases monotonically to 0 as x moves towards the maximum




(f0(x)x + f(x))R(x) ￿ f2(x)x
R2(x)
(3)
which is likely to be negative for most values of x if we assume that f(x) is left
skewed and approaches 0 as x approaches the maximum value of its domain.
However, even assuming such a \reasonable" f(￿), Proposition 3 may be far
away from reality if status is cardinal. This is easily seen by substituting R(x) with
the very simple form of cardinal status C(x) = (x=
R x1
x0 sf(s)ds), where x1 is the
maximum value of x in the relevant population. If status is C(x) then the elasticity
of status with respect to the consumption of the positional good is ECx = 1 and
therefore the relative saving behaviour only depends on the ratio EU3=EU2. If, for
instance, preferences are assumed to be homothetic as in Frank’s Proposition 3 0,
then the model provides quite di￿erent predictions, namely the neutrality of status
3concerns. In fact, even in the presence of status concerns, poor people save the same
income share as rich people.
2.2 Example 2: Following Behaviour
In a well known article of a decade ago Clark and Oswald (1998) investigate which
type of preferences induce a following behaviour { i.e. the desire to conform { in
the presence of concerns for status. Their conclusion is that \models in which it is
assumed that people have a taste for conformity can be justi￿ed at a more primitive
axiomatic level by appealing to comparison-concave utility" (pag. 152). Such a
result is obtained from the study of the following consumer problem
max
a U = sv(g(a;a￿)) + (1 ￿ s)u(a) ￿ c(a) (4)
where a is the consumer’s choice variable (e.g. consumption), v(￿) determines the
bene￿ts accruing from status, g(￿) determines the consumer’s status, a￿ is an aggre-
gate statistic of others’ choice, the parameter s represents the relative importance
of status concerns, u(￿) determines all other bene￿ts of a and c(￿) all other costs.
Finally, it is assumed that U(￿) is strictly concave in a.
Clark and Oswald (1998) de￿ne follow behaviour as @^ a=@a￿ > 0 where ^ a is the
solution to the consumer problem. They investigate what makes people adopt a
follow behaviour under two di￿erent types of cardinal status: g1 = (a ￿ a￿) and
g2 = a=a￿. They ￿nd that the key preference parameter is concavity of v(￿). Under
g1 consumers adopt a following behaviour if and only if v(￿) is concave (Proposition 1
pag. 138) while under g2 the follow behaviour is adopted if and only if the elasticity
of marginal utility with respect to status exceeds unity (Proposition 3 pag. 141)
which obtains for a function v(￿) su￿ciently concave. We claim that both results
are true only if status is cardinal. In particular, we show that under ordinal status it
may happen that people adopt a follow behaviour even if v(￿) is strictly convex. Let
us assume, for the sake of the argument, that there is a continuum of individuals.
Suppose also that status is ordinal and, in particular, determined by g3 =
R a
a0 f(r)dr
where a0 is the minimum value of a in the relevant population and f(￿) is the density
function for the a values. For simplicity assume that f(￿) is uniformly distributed










+ (1 ￿ s)u0(a) ￿ c0(a) = 0 (5)
4where a1 is the maximum value of a in the relevant population. Consider a generic
individual whose optimal choice is ^ a and suppose that all other individuals increase
their consumption by an amount which is equal to half of the di￿erence between
their initial consumption and a1. The resulting distribution of consumption levels
f0 is again uniform but on the smaller interval [ a0 + (a1 ￿ a0)=2;￿ a].1 Let ^ a0 be the
















=) ^ a0 > ^ a (6)
which means that follow behaviour can arise even if v(￿) is strictly convex. The
reason is that the anti-conformist e￿ect due to the convexity of v(￿) is more than
compensated by the increased advantage of consuming which stems from the fact
that now population is more dense and, therefore, more status is gained by one extra
unit of consumption.
3 Conclusion
In models incorporating concerns for relative standing, the modelling choice between
ordinal and cardinal status is never an object of discussion. We have provided
two examples which prove that the two alternatives may lead to rather di￿erent
predictions. In the light of this, we conclude that it is not legitimate to make such
a choice without accurately motivating it.
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